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INTRODUCTION

Restitution is an independent basis of civil liability, parallel
to contract and tort. Despite its importance, however, the law of
restitution may not be as familiar to lawyers as the law of contract
or the law of tort.1 The purpose of this article is to provide a brief
primer on restitution, with respect to the substantive law of
unjust enrichment, various restitutionary remedies, and possible
defenses to a claim in restitution.
In presenting this overview, I draw from the essential
resource on the subject—the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, published by the American Law Institute
in 20112—as well as pertinent Rhode Island cases. To facilitate
reader understanding of the subject, the text of this article focuses
on legal concepts rather than case descriptions. Supporting Rhode
Island cases are cited extensively in the footnotes. Part I of the
article discusses general principles pertaining to the law of
restitution; Part II addresses liability in restitution (the cause of
action in unjust enrichment); Part III describes restitutionary
remedies; and Part IV discusses defenses that are unique to the
cause of action in unjust enrichment.
I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

To provide background for the ensuing discussion of
restitutionary causes of action and remedies, this part of the
article discusses general principles that pertain to the law of
1. Professor Andrew Kull, the Reporter of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011), in 2000 lamented that “a
substantial portion of the American bench and bar today could not
comfortably explain what the ‘law of restitution is’ or how it works.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT reporter’s
intro. memo., at xvi (Discussion Draft 2000). He attributed the lack of
familiarity about restitution in part to the disappearance of a course on
restitution from the U.S. law school curriculum in the mid-1960s. Id.
2. The American Law Institute has explained the function of
Restatements: “Restatements are addressed to courts and others applying
existing law. Restatements aim at clear formulations of common law and its
statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently stands or
might plausibly be stated by a court.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING
THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS
AND
THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2015), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/StyleManual.pdf.
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restitution. Besides defining the concepts of “restitution” and
“unjust enrichment,” this part also offers distinctive advantages of
the unjust enrichment cause of action and of restitutionary
remedies. Moreover, although restitution and unjust enrichment
often are termed “equitable” in the loose sense of “fairness,” this
part makes clear that some forms of restitution are technically
“legal” while other forms are technically “equitable.” Finally, this
part explains that the law of restitution is subordinate to the law
of contract in two principal respects: 1) the terms of an enforceable
contract normally displace a claim in unjust enrichment, and 2)
non-gratuitous transfers of benefits are expected to be made
pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible.
A. Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Defined
The terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are
interchangeable to denote a basis of civil liability, distinct from
contract or tort, that is premised on the basic principle that: “A
person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
subject to liability in restitution.”3 To be “unjustly enriched” is to
obtain an economic benefit (such as money, property, a service, a
saved expenditure, or a discharged obligation) when that benefit
was transferred without an adequate legal basis.4 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court has recognized unjust enrichment as a
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1; see
also Zambarano v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of the State of R.I., 61 A.3d
432, 438 (R.I. 2013) (“‘Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a
benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust
enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.’” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. a)).
4. See, e.g., APG, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 436 F.3d 294, 306 (1st
Cir. 2006) (applying Rhode Island law to conclude that an unjust enrichment
claim could be asserted by a subdistributor against a seller for time and effort
expended by the subdistributor to sell products of the seller); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Drainville, CA 07-427 ML, 2009 WL 1209473, at *4 (D.R.I. May 4,
2009) (noting that “benefit” is construed broadly under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment but expressing doubts that refraining from legal action
constitutes a “benefit”); Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 99
(R.I. 2006) (stating that materials, services, improvements to property, and
stolen utilities are examples of benefits within the law of unjust enrichment);
Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 113–14 (R.I. 2005) (home
improvements constituted a benefit under the law of unjust enrichment);
Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gautier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148–49 (R.I. 1994) (medical
services constituted a benefit under the law of unjust enrichment).
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distinctive cause of action and stated its fundamental elements:
[U]njust enrichment . . . can stand alone as a cause of
action in its own right. To recover for unjust enrichment,
a claimant must prove: (1) that he or she conferred a
benefit upon the party from whom relief is sought; (2)
that the recipient appreciated the benefit; and (3) that the
recipient accepted the benefit under such circumstances
“that it would be inequitable for [the recipient] to retain
the benefit without paying the value thereof.”5
The cause of action in unjust enrichment historically has been
recognized under different names such as “implied-in-law
contract” and “quasi-contract.”6 (A claim for “quantum meruit”
technically can be either a contract claim or an unjust enrichment
claim, depending on the circumstances.)7 The nomenclature of
5. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d at 113 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 673 (R.I. 1997)).
Regarding the second requirement for a cause of action in unjust enrichment,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that “a benefit is
‘appreciated’ when the defendant has used it in a way that has value to the
defendant.” R.I. State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., CA No. 12-198S, 2013
WL 5509200, at *8 (D.R.I. May 31, 2013) (report and recommendation) (citing
Carbone, 898 A.2d at 99–100), adopted in part and rejected in part by R.I.
State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., C.A. No. 12-198S, 2013 WL 5205800
(D.R.I. Sept. 13, 2013).
6. See, e.g., Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC, 61 A.3d
414, 418 (R.I. 2013) (“This Court has held that actions brought upon theories
of unjust enrichment and quasi contract are essentially the same.” (quoting
Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I. 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Hurdis Realty, Inc. v. N. Providence, 397 A.2d 896, 897 (R.I. 1979)
(equating “implied in law contract” with “quasi-contract”).
7. A recent decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Process
Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. DiGregorio, Inc., 93 A.3d 1047, 1052–53
(R.I. 2014) has some confusing language that attempts to distinguish
between quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, citing a Connecticut
appellate court case and Black’s Law Dictionary. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT more clearly explains the potential
overlap between quantum meruit and the cause of action in unjust
enrichment:
If it is appropriate to conclude that a promise to pay reasonable
compensation (usually measured by market price) was part of the
parties’ agreement—although nowhere expressed in so many
words—a recovery called “quantum meruit” enforces an implied term
of an actual contract. Such an obligation is part of contract law, not
restitution . . . . [Q]uantum meruit . . . was equally available to
recover the value of benefits conferred in cases where the defendant
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“quasi contract” and “implied-in-law contract” is misleading,
however. The cause of action in unjust enrichment does not
require a contract; no prior consent between the parties, either
express or implied, is necessary.8 Thus, it is better to use the
terms “unjust enrichment” or “restitution,” making clear that this
basis of civil liability is independent of contract law.
Very importantly, in contrast to contract or tort causes of
action, the cause of action in unjust enrichment in many contexts
does not require that the recipient of the benefit have been at
fault. For example, a claimant who mistakenly conferred a benefit
on a recipient may be entitled to restitution of the benefit itself or
the value of the benefit.9 Even if the recipient was not at fault in
receiving the benefit or even if the claimant was the one at fault in
conferring the benefit, the claimant may recover in restitution if
the recipient was unjustly enriched. Moreover, a cause of action
in unjust enrichment may exist even if the claimant has not
suffered an economic loss; the cause of action depends instead on
whether the recipient has unjustly received an economic benefit
from the claimant.10
B. Distinctive Advantages of the Unjust Enrichment Cause of
Action and of Restitutionary Remedies
Restitution, in both its substantive and remedial aspects, has
several distinctive advantages over other civil causes of action and
had made no promise, express or implied. A classic example is the
action to recover the value of medical services to an unconscious
patient. . . . No lawyer today would describe the patient’s obligation
as contractual, but restitution in such cases—being pleaded in
quantum meruit—was long said to be based on a “contract implied in
law.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. e.
8. See, e.g., Hurdis Realty, 397 A.2d at 897 (equating “implied in law
contract” with “quasi-contract” and stating that liability under either label “is
implied by the law and arises from the facts and circumstances irrespective of
any agreement or presumed intention”).
9. See infra Part II.A.1.
10. An example is a fiduciary that uses the beneficiary’s money for the
fiduciary’s own purposes, makes a profit with that money, and restores the
beneficiary’s money in full before the legal violation is discovered. Even
though the beneficiary did not sustain an economic loss, the fiduciary was
unjustly enriched by wrongfully taking the money from the beneficiary, and
the fiduciary will be required to disgorge to the beneficiary the profit gained.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. b.
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remedies. The law of restitution is advantageous in the following
circumstances:
 Claimant’s only cause of action is unjust enrichment
(i.e., the circumstances do not present a tort, contract,
or statutory cause of action)
 Recipient’s gain from receiving a benefit at Claimant’s
expense exceeds Claimant’s loss
 Recipient’s gain is easier to prove than Claimant’s loss
 Claimant wants to rescind a transaction (such as a
contract) and obtain restitution of any benefit that
Claimant conferred pursuant to the transaction
 Recipient is insolvent and Claimant is able to identify
and obtain a specific asset held by Recipient in which
Claimant is deemed to have an equitable interest
 Claimant seeks to obtain its asset or the traceable
product of its asset in the possession of a third person
Part II, discussing the cause of action in unjust enrichment, and
Part III, discussing restitutionary remedies, will delve into the
required elements for any of the foregoing advantages to be
realized.
C. Restitution May be “Legal” or “Equitable”
The cause of action in unjust enrichment has been loosely
termed “equitable” in the general sense of achieving fairness.11
11. In apparently the first case to articulate the general principle of
unjust enrichment in English law, Moses v. MacFerlan, Lord Mansfield
stated—in a common law court (not an equity court)—that:
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural
justice to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action,
founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s case . . . In one word, the gist
of this kind of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances
of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to
refund the money.
(1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.) 678, 681. Although Lord Mansfield employed
the term “equity” and “equitable” throughout his opinion, he used those terms
in a nontechnical way to connote fairness. One of the leading American
restitution scholars in the early to mid-twentieth century stated: “Restitution
is the equitable principle by which one who has been enriched at the expense
of another, whether by mistake, or otherwise, is under a duty to return what
he has received or its value to the other. Perhaps unjust enrichment would
be a better term.” Warren A. Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OKLA. L.
REV. 257, 257 (1954). Here again, the term “equitable” is used in the
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However, as a technical and historical matter, some strands of
restitution are “legal,” while others are “equitable.”12 Some Rhode
Island decisions (as well as numerous decisions in other courts)
have erroneously asserted that unjust enrichment or restitution is
exclusively “equitable” in the technical sense.13
Concrete
consequences, including whether a right to jury trial exists,
whether an action is authorized by statute, and whether certain
types of defenses are available, depend on a proper understanding
of which restitutionary causes of action and remedies are
technically “legal” and which are technically “equitable.”
Typically, a simple money judgment for the value of a benefit
obtained by the defendant is a “legal” remedy, as is monetary
restitution of a defendant’s unjust gain of money.14 By contrast,
the asset-based remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien
are technically “equitable” remedies.15
D. The Primacy of Contract Law
If the parties have a valid contract between them, any rights
nontechnical meaning of fairness.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4.
13. See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU
L. REV. 1577, 1607–34 (2002) (discussing how federal courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States, have confused nontechnical with
technical uses of the term “equitable” in classifying monetary restitution).
For examples of Rhode Island opinions that failed to recognize that many
actions for unjust enrichment are technically and historically “legal” rather
than “equitable,” see United Lending Corp. v. Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 632
(R.I. 2003) (“It is true that claims for unjust enrichment sound in equity and
that in general, equitable actions do not fall within the purview of [R.I.G.L.]
45-15-5.” (citations omitted)); Rosetta v. Moretti, No. 98-89, 2005 WL
1109638, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 4, 2005) (“Unjust enrichment sounds in
equity and as such, it is a matter to be decided ultimately by the Court. It is
a matter for the Court, not the jury, to decide.”).
14. See Murphy, supra note 13, at 1598–1607 (discussing legal and
equitable roots of restitution and documenting that monetary recovery of
defendant’s gain of money generally is a remedy at law with some important
exceptions—recovery of money is a remedy in equity when the money was
obtained by abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship, when the
defendant is insolvent and the plaintiff thus needs a constructive trust or
equitable lien, or when the plaintiff seeks to trace its property through
subsequent changes in form or into the hands of a third person).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4
cmt. d (stating that “the hallmark of equitable remedies in restitution cases is
that they give relief to the claimant via rights in identifiable assets” and
citing the constructive trust and equitable lien as examples).
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and remedies are governed by the law of contract, not the law of
unjust enrichment.16 A cause of action in unjust enrichment may
not displace rights and obligations specified by a valid contract.17
Moreover, the law of unjust enrichment should not undermine
legal incentives to enter contracts. Thus, it is often said that one
who voluntarily conferred a benefit has no cause of action in
unjust enrichment. This general proposition is subject to some
exceptions, such as when the benefit was conferred in an
emergency situation.18 As the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment explains, “[t]here is no liability in
restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred,
unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant’s
intervention in the absence of contract.”19
II. LIABILITY IN RESTITUTION: THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN UNJUST
ENRICHMENT

As the law governing liability for the transfer of a benefit
without an adequate legal basis, the law of unjust enrichment
applies in many different contexts. The general categories of
liability in unjust enrichment are: when a benefit was acquired by
a transfer subject to avoidance (such as benefit transferred by
mistake or by defective consent); when the recipient of the benefit
did not request the benefit but it would be unjust for the recipient
to retain the benefit without paying for it (such as when the

16. See, e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002).
17. See, e.g., Café La France, Inc. v. Schneider Sec., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d
361, 375 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating that under Rhode Island law, “[u]njust
enrichment is an equitable doctrine that, in the absence of an enforceable
contract, allows a plaintiff to recover a benefit transferred to a defendant if
that defendant’s ongoing possession would be inequitable” but concluding
that an enforceable contract existed between the parties, thus precluding the
plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim (citing Doe, 808 A.2d at 1095)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (“A valid
contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope,
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.”).
18. See infra Part II.B.1.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(3);
see also E. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Ricci, 565 A.2d 1265, 1272–73 (R.I. 1989)
(“When a party makes improvements or confers a benefit upon the land of
another with full knowledge that title is vested in another, or subject to
dispute, the improver will not be entitled to restitution under the . . . doctrine
of unjust enrichment.”).
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restitution claimant conferred the benefit in an emergency); when
the recipient requested the benefit but the restitution claimant
does not have a valid contract claim against the recipient; and
when the benefit was wrongfully acquired (such as by tort or
breach of a fiduciary or confidential duty). In the next few
sections, I will discuss these categories in turn.
A. Benefit Was Acquired Through a Transfer Subject to
Avoidance
Liability in restitution may exist when the restitution
claimant has transferred a benefit to the recipient, but the
transfer was, in the words of the Restatement (Third),
“imperfectly voluntary” and thus subject to rescission or
avoidance.20 Common contexts in which the transfer of a benefit
is subject to avoidance are when the restitution claimant
transferred a benefit by mistake or when the transfer of a benefit
was the product of defective consent or authority.21
1.

Mistake

One who receives a benefit by mistake may be liable in
restitution, notwithstanding that the recipient may have been
innocent in receiving the benefit.22 Courts applying Rhode Island
law have recognized a cause of action in unjust enrichment for
mistaken payment of money,23 mistaken good faith improvement
of another’s property,24 and mistaken performance of another’s
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch. 2,
intro. note.
21. See id. The Restatement also discusses “payment of a judgment
subsequently reversed or avoided, or payment of a tax not legally due” as
transfers subject to avoidance, giving rise to potential unjust enrichment.
Id.; see also id. at §§ 18–19.
22. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 5–12.
23. See, e.g., RBS Citizens v. Avaya, Inc., CA No. 14-cv-02-M, 2013 WL
2158933, at *12 (D.R.I. May 23, 2014) (describing allegations of overpayment
as pleading a plausible unjust enrichment claim); Toupin v. Laverdiere, 729
A.2d 1286, 1288–89 (R.I. 1999) (allowing recovery of mistaken overpayment).
24. See, e.g., Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 114 (R.I. 2005)
(finding former daughter-in-law entitled to restitution of the appreciated
value attributable to improvements she made to a house owned by her inlaws when she reasonably believed her in-laws intended the house to be a
wedding gift to her and her husband.). A property owner that improves its
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obligation.25 One who mistakenly conferred a benefit on another
has a claim in unjust enrichment against the recipient of the
benefit, subject to the recipient’s possible defense that it
innocently and justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistake.26
2.

Defective Consent or Authority27

Examples of a benefit conferred by defective consent or
authority include a benefit obtained by fraud or material
misrepresentation,28 duress,29 or undue influence.30 Yet another
property, with the incidental effect that a neighbor’s property increases in
value, does not have a cause of action in unjust enrichment against the
neighbor. See, e.g., R.I. State Pier Props., LLC v. Cargill, Inc., C.A. No. 12198S, 2013 WL 5205800, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 13, 2013) (stating that, although
RISPP’s work on its own property increased the value of Cargill’s property,
RISPP’s unjust enrichment claim against Cargill failed); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. b, illus.
2 (“Improvements to A’s property increase the market value of B’s adjoining
land. B sells and realizes substantial additional proceeds as the result of A’s
expenditure. B is not liable to A in restitution.”).
25. See, e.g., Alessi v. Bowen Court Condo., No. 03-0235, 2010 WL
897246 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2010) (finding that plaintiff, who paid
property taxes on the mistaken belief that he owned the property, was
entitled to restitution from defendant who actually owned the property.).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 13–19.
28. See, e.g., J. K. Social Club v. J. K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134
(R.I. 1982) (acknowledging that fraud can lead to the creation of a
constructive trust); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 13 (discussing liability in restitution when the transfer of a
benefit was induced by fraud or material misrepresentation).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 14
(discussing liability in restitution when the transfer of a benefit was induced
by duress and defining duress as “coercion that is wrongful as a matter of
law”).
30. See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, No. CA 03-219-S, 2004 WL 5308782, at
*9 (D.R.I. Nov. 30, 2004) (report and recommendation) (concluding that
Rhode Island law allows an action for undue influence and stating “that
undue influence is not a tort, but rather a set of circumstances which gives
rise to an equitable remedy, such as rescission, restitution, or, . . . imposition
of a constructive trust” (citations omitted)), report and recommendation
adopted by Umsted v. Umsted, No. 03-CV-219-S, 2005 WL 5438379 (D.R.I.
Feb. 18, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 15 (discussing liability in restitution for a transfer of a benefit
that was induced by undue influence and defining undue influence as
“excessive and unfair persuasion, sufficient to overcome the free will of the
transferor, between parties who occupy either a confidential relation or a
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example is a benefit obtained from someone who lacked the legal
capacity to transfer the benefit.31 When the claimant’s consent to
the transfer of the benefit was impaired for one of these reasons,
the claimant has a claim in unjust enrichment against the
recipient of the benefit.
B. Benefit Was Not Requested, but Recipient Would be Unjustly
Enriched If Recipient Did Not Pay for the Benefit
In some circumstances, the recipient of the benefit did not
request the benefit but it would nonetheless be unjust for the
recipient to retain the benefit. The Restatement (Third) addresses
three broad contexts in which a claimant could be considered to
have justifiably conferred an unrequested benefit on the recipient,
with the claimant possibly entitled restitution: “emergency
intervention,”32 “performance rendered to a third person,”33 and
“self-interested intervention.”34
1.

Emergency Intervention

A person who confers a benefit in an emergency to protect
another’s life or health,35 or to protect another’s property,36 or to
relation of dominance on one side and subservience on the other”).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
16, 33 (discussing liability in restitution when the benefit at issue was
transferred from “a person lacking requisite legal capacity” to make the
transfer; examples include minors, those who have a mental incapacity, and
certain legal entities that acted outside the scope of their statutory
authority).
32. Id. §§ 20–22.
33. Id. §§ 23–25.
34. Id. §§ 26–30.
35. See id. § 20 (“(1) A person who performs, supplies, or obtains
professional services required for the protection of another’s life or health is
entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision to intervene without
request. (2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by a
reasonable charge for the services in question.”).
36. See id. § 21 (“(1) A person who takes effective action to protect
another’s property from threatened harm is entitled to restitution from the
other as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify
the decision to intervene without request. Unrequested intervention is
justified only when it is reasonable to assume the owner would wish the
action performed. (2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by
the loss avoided or by a reasonable charge for the services provided,
whichever is less.”). In Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414, 417–18 (R.I. 1969), the
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perform another’s duty37 has a cause of action in unjust
enrichment against the recipient of the benefit.
2.

Performance Rendered to a Third Person

If a claimant performed an obligation of its own, and that
performance also had the effect of discharging an obligation of
another person, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the
other person as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.38 Rights
to indemnification, contribution, and equitable subrogation fall in
this category.39
3.

Self-interested Intervention

A claim in unjust enrichment may be available to one who has
made self-interested expenditures to protect, maintain, improve,
or add value to an asset in which another person also has an
interest.
For example, if the claimant makes necessary
expenditures to protect an interest in its property and thus
confers an economic benefit on another person in consequence of
the other’s interest in the same property, the claimant has a cause
of action in unjust enrichment.40 Another example is that of a
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that a plaintiff who accepted a racehorse
for boarding at his farm, when both the buyer and seller of the horse
disclaimed ownership of the horse, was a mere “volunteer” and thus did not
have a right to restitution from the defendant buyer. This result is
inconsistent with the majority view expressed in the Restatement (Third)
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. Section 21 of the Restatement bases
Illustration 11 on this case and asserts that a plaintiff in such a circumstance
would indeed be “entitled to an equitable lien on the horse, securing to that
extent a claim in restitution for the value of its services in preserving the
property; but [plaintiff] has no claim under this section against either [b]uyer
or [s]eller apart from its rights as lienor.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. d, illus. 11.
37. See, e.g., Hurdis Realty, Inc. v. N. Providence, 397 A.2d 896, 897 (R.I.
1979) (finding that municipality was liable for unjust enrichment for cost of
repairs that property owner expended to repair town sewer line when
municipality had the duty to maintain the sewer system, the problem
required “immediate attention,” and the property owner had unsuccessfully
attempted to get the municipality to repair the sewer line); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
23–25.
39. See id.
40. See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, 39 A. 243, 243 (R.I. 1898) (finding
that life tenant, having paid city’s assessments for installing curb and sewer
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claimant who makes expenditures to an asset that the claimant
reasonably expects to acquire or retain, the claimant’s expectation
is frustrated, and another person becomes the unintended
beneficiary of the expenditures.41
Yet another example,
recognized in a decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, is
that of a person who confers an economic benefit on his intimate
cohabitant and the benefit in turn makes it possible for the
intimate cohabitant to acquire property.42
C. Benefit Was Requested by Recipient but Claimant Does Not
Have a Valid Contract Claim
An unjust enrichment claim is available to a claimant who
transferred a benefit pursuant to a contract, but, for one of several
possible reasons, the claimant has no valid claim on the
contract.43 The claimant would lack a viable contract claim if: (1)
the contract, when made, was unenforceable44 (e.g., the contract

in order to prevent the sale of the property by the city treasurer, was entitled
to restitution from the defendant who would obtain the property upon the
death of the life tenant); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 26.
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
27.
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002)
(recognizing a potential cause of action in unjust enrichment between two
men who cohabited in an intimate relationship when services rendered by
one of the men might have aided in the acquisition of property by the other
man; court did not require proof of a confidential or fiduciary relationship or
a breach of that relationship); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28(1) (stating that, unless contrary to state law, “[i]f
two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship resembling
marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to which the other has
made substantial, uncompensated contributions [either] in the form of
property or services, the person making such contributions has a claim in
restitution . . . to prevent unjust enrichment”).
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
31–36. As courts applying Rhode Island law have summarized, a party to a
contract may recover for unjust enrichment if the contract was “‘breached,
rescinded, or otherwise made invalid, or [if] the benefit received was outside
the scope of the contract.’” High Rock Westminster St. LLC v. Bank of
America, C.A. No. 13-500, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2014)
(quoting Tantara Corp. v. Bay St. Neighborhood Ass’n, LLC, C.A. No. NC-1155, 2012 WL 4848704, at *16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012)).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
31.
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was not in writing as required by statute45 or the contract terms
are indefinite46); (2) the contract is illegal or otherwise
unenforceable as a matter of public policy;47 (3) the recipient of
the performance lacked the capacity to contract;48 (4) an initially
valid contract is avoided subsequent to the claimant’s performance
because of mistake or supervening change of circumstances;49 (5)
the recipient demanded, and the claimant supplied, a performance
that was not due under the contract;50 or (6) the claimant who
conferred a benefit under the contract also materially breached
the contract.51 In the foregoing circumstances, the claimant
generally would be entitled to return of the benefit conferred or
the value of the benefit. Moreover, an unjust enrichment claim is
available to one who erroneously believed that a contract had been
45. See, e.g., Brochu v. Santis, 939 A.2d 449, 452–53 (R.I. 2008) (holding
broker did not have a cause of action in unjust enrichment for real estate
brokerage commission when agreement between parties was not in writing as
required by Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-4(6)). Depending on court
interpretation of statutes that require a writing and of public policy,
performance rendered under an oral agreement may or may not trigger a
right to restitution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 31, cmts. b, f.
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31
cmts. b, d.
47. See id. § 32. The Restatement states that the distinction between
“unenforceable” and “illegal” agreements “may usually be drawn by inquiring
whether the contract at issue is one for which the law merely establishes
special evidentiary requirements, or whether the underlying transaction is
one that the law actually condemns.” Id. at § 31 cmt. b.
48. See, e.g., Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1148–49
(R.I. 1994) (explaining that, even if the individual did not have capacity to
contract, the individual would still be liable under the law of unjust
enrichment for reasonable charges for medical services rendered); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33.
49. See, e.g., Parker v. Macomber, 24 A. 464, 465 (R.I. 1892) (holding
that plaintiff who rendered homecare services with his wife to defendant
pursuant to contract was entitled to restitution for the value of the services
rendered even though full performance of contract had become impossible
when his wife died); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 34.
50. See, e.g., High Rock Westminster St. LLC v. Bank of America, C.A.
No. 13-500, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2 (D.R.I. Aug. 6, 2014) (noting that a cause
of action in unjust enrichment may be appropriate when the benefit received
was outside the scope of the contract); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 35.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
36.
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formed and, because of that erroneous belief, conferred a benefit
on the recipient.52
A claimant may assert both a claim for breach of an
enforceable contract and a claim in unjust enrichment, but those
claims must be pleaded in the alternative.53 To recover in unjust
enrichment for a benefit conferred under a contract, the claimant
must allege that the contract was void, invalid, or otherwise
flawed.54 If the court finds that the claimant does not have a valid
contract claim, the claimant may continue with its unjust
enrichment claim. If, however, a valid contract claim exists, the
appropriate cause of action is breach of contract, not unjust
enrichment.55

52. See, e.g., Branch v. Cardillo, C.A. No. PC-07-620, 2011 WL 757389,
at *6–*7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2011) (finding parties did not reach meeting
of the minds to form a contract, nor was there promissory estoppel, but
defendant’s sisters mistakenly believed that an agreement with the
defendant existed; court therefore concluded that defendant had been
unjustly enriched by sisters’ payments of expenses associated with
defendant’s property). In Branch, it is noteworthy that the plaintiffs did not
plead unjust enrichment; the court on its own recognized this basis of
liability. Id. at *8 n.5.
53. See, e.g., RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Avaya, Inc., C.A. No. 14-cv-02-M,
2014 WL 2158933, at *4 (D.R.I. May 23, 2014) (noting that the plaintiff was
allowed to assert both a breach of contract claim and an unjust enrichment
claim in the alternative); Hasbro, Inc. v. Mikohn Gaming Corp., No. Civ.A.
05-106-S, 2006 WL 2035501, at *8–9 (D.R.I. July 18, 2006) (stating that
Rhode Island law allows a party to plead alternative claims for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment (citing Richmond Square Capital Corp. v.
Ins. House, 744 A.2d 401, 402 (R.I. 1999)).
54. See, e.g., High Rock, 2014 WL 3867699, at *2, *3 n.4.
55. See, e.g., id. at *2 (“[W]hen the benefit received was conferred under
the terms of a contract and there is no allegation that the contract was
invalid, voidable, unclear, or otherwise flawed, a court may properly dismiss
the unjust enrichment claim.”); see also Café La France, Inc. v. Schneider
Sec., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 361, 375 (D.R.I. 2003) (stating that under Rhode
Island law, “[u]njust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that, in the absence
of an enforceable contract, allows a plaintiff to recover a benefit transferred
to a defendant if that defendant’s ongoing possession would be inequitable”
but concluding that an enforceable contract existed between the parties, thus
obviating the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim (citing Doe v. Burkland, 808
A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 2(2) (“A valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as
to matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust
enrichment.”).
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D. Benefit Was Wrongfully Acquired
If a legal wrong to the claimant resulted in an economic
benefit to the recipient, the claimant is entitled to restitution of
the gain.56 One type of legal wrong that may give rise to a claim
in unjust enrichment is the intentional and wrongful interference
with an intended donative transfer of a benefit.57 The intended
donee of the benefit has an unjust enrichment claim against the
recipient of the benefit, whether the misconduct was the act of the
recipient or of a third person.58 Other legal wrongs that may
result in an economic gain to the recipient are torts and violations
of a fiduciary or confidential relation; I will elaborate on these
bases for an unjust enrichment claim below.
1.

Tort

When the recipient has acquired a benefit because of a tort
committed against the claimant (such as fraud, misappropriation
of funds, or conversion of property), the claimant may pursue
either a tort claim or an unjust enrichment claim against the
person who committed the tort.59
Significantly, an unjust
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3
(“A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.”).
57. The Restatement (Third) states that
[i]f assets that would otherwise have passed by donative transfer to
the claimant are diverted to another recipient by fraud, duress,
undue influence, or other intentional misconduct, the recipient is
liable to the claimant for unjust enrichment. The misconduct that
invalidates the transfer to the recipient may be the act of the
recipient or of a third person.
Id. § 46(1) (“Wrongful Interference with Donative Transfer”). See also id. at §
45 (“Homicide: the Slayer Rule”).
58. See id. at § 46(1).
59. See, e.g., Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 998 F.2d
1092, 1100 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that under Rhode Island law, “the
existence of fraud or other wrongdoing is a factor in determining whether the
retention of a benefit would be inequitable”). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 40–42. But see Hauser v.
Davis, No. C.A. KC 93-0295, 2000 WL 1910031, *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 21,
2000) (holding that because defendant took benefit from plaintiff, it was not
conferred upon him and thus recovery was in tort, which was barred by the
statute of limitations, not unjust enrichment). Hauser is inconsistent with
the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and the Restatement, which
indicate that a cause of action in unjust enrichment may encompass benefits
tortiously obtained. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
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enrichment claim can be successful against a person who did not
commit the tort or even know of the tort, provided the person was
unjustly enriched by a benefit that resulted from the tort.60
The cause of action in unjust enrichment may provide a more
favorable remedy than the cause of action in tort. Specifically, if
the defendant’s gain from the benefit exceeded the claimant’s loss
and the defendant was a conscious tortfeasor, the claimant may
seek disgorgement of the defendant’s gain in unjust enrichment
rather than compensatory damages for the claimant’s loss in
tort.61 A classic and widely cited case in another jurisdiction is
Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., in which the plaintiff was able to
obtain, on a unjust enrichment cause of action, the disgorgement
of the defendant’s profits (the defendant’s savings of labor costs)
from the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s abandoned egg-washing
machine.62 If the plaintiff had instead pursued a tort claim, the
measure of recovery would have been the plaintiff’s loss—rental
value of the machine—the amount of which was substantially less
than the defendant’s labor savings.63
2. Breach of a Fiduciary Duty or Breach of an Equivalent Duty
Imposed by a Relation of Trust or Confidence
One who violated a fiduciary or confidential duty to the
claimant is liable for the claimant’s losses or, under an alternative
claim for unjust enrichment, for any net profit that the recipient
gained from violating the duty.64 To determine whether a

ENRICHMENT § 40.
60. See, e.g., Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 93, 99–100
(R.I. 2006) (finding that the wife of a tortfeasor, who illegally diverted
electricity to their home, was jointly and severally liable for unjust
enrichment even though she did not know of the electricity bypass).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch.
5, topic 1, intro. note.
62. 173 P.2d 652, 653, 655 (Wash. 1947).
63. Id. at 654.
64. See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 42–50 (1st Cir. 2003)
(predicting, in a case for breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders of
closely held corporation, that Rhode Island law would allow plaintiffs either
to obtain a remedy measured by the plaintiffs’ loss—the difference in price
between what they received for their stock and its fair value at the time of
sale—or a remedy based on the defendants’ wrongful profits in order to avoid
unjust enrichment); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 43.
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fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between parties, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated:
The court may consider a variety of factors, including the
reliance of one party upon the other, the relationship of
the parties prior to the incidents complained of, the
relative business capacities or lack thereof between the
parties, and the readiness of one party to follow the
other’s guidance in complicated transactions. There is no
requirement in this jurisdiction that a defendant must
occupy a position of dominance over a plaintiff.65
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has at times found a
fiduciary or confidential relationship to have existed between
family members,66 although it has also stated that “[c]onfidential
or fiduciary relationships do not inherently exist between family
members.”67
Courts applying Rhode Island law to unjust
enrichment claims have also found fiduciary or confidential
relationships to have existed between a company and a director
and officer of the company,68 between minority shareholders of a
closely held family corporation and directors and officers of the
corporation,69 and between persons in intimate, but unmarried,
65. Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 129 (R.I. 1985) (citation omitted).
66. See, e.g., id. (finding a confidential relationship between a brother
and sister when siblings had complete trust and confidence in one another
and their relationship was a motivating factor in influencing the brother to
name his sister as primary beneficiary); Cahill v. Antonelli, 390 A.2d 936, 939
(R.I. 1978) (finding a fiduciary relationship between a brother and sister
because the brother had acted as an agent of his sister); Del Greco v. Del
Greco, 142 A.2d 714, 717 (R.I. 1958) (finding a fiduciary relationship between
a mother and son because the mother had trusted her son to care for her
during the remainder of her life).
67. Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111–12 (R.I. 2005) (finding
former daughter-in-law not entitled to a constructive trust over a house
owned by her in-laws and in which she resided because facts did not establish
a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the plaintiff and her former
in-laws).
68. See, e.g., Sladen v. Rowse, 347 A.2d 409, 412–13 (R.I. 1975)
(imposing constructive trust on stock in favor of company because defendant,
who was a director and officer of the company, breached his fiduciary
obligations by diverting the opportunity to buy the stock at a low price to
himself).
69. See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 (D.R.I. 2004)
(finding that defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders by failing to disclose that the corporation soon might be sold).
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relationships.70
III. RESTITUTIONARY REMEDIES

A number of remedies are restitutionary. Examples include a
money judgment based on the defendant’s gain rather than the
claimant’s loss, the return of benefits that were transferred before
a contract was rescinded, the constructive trust, and the equitable
lien. The simplest remedy for a court to impose is the return to
the plaintiff of the exact benefit that the defendant received,
whether the benefit was money or a different type of asset. Many
restitutionary remedies are not so simple, however. A benefit may
be nonreturnable, such as when the benefit was in the form of
services. A restitution claimant may be entitled to more than the
exact benefit that the recipient obtained. An asset transferred
from the claimant to the recipient may have changed into a
different form or been transferred into the hands of a third person.
In the following sections, I will discuss these complexities,
focusing on restitution through a money judgment and restitution
through the asset-based remedies of constructive trust and
equitable lien.
A.

Restitution Through a Money Judgment71

If a defendant has been unjustly enriched by money obtained
from the claimant, the measure of monetary restitution is
generally the amount that was transferred from the claimant to
the defendant.72 An important exception to this rule is posed by
the defaulting fiduciary or the “conscious wrongdoer” who acted
with knowledge of the underlying wrong to the claimant or despite

70. See, e.g., Randeau v. Laplante, C.A. No. WC-2011-0116, 2013 WL
5502262, at *14–16, *19 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (finding a fiduciary
relationship existed between an unmarried couple, but concluding that there
had not been a breach of a promise or an act involving fraud, and thus, a
constructive trust could not be imposed); Nani v. Vanasse, No. C.A. PC/05955, 2003 WL 24274579, at *7–10, *12 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2003) (finding
confidential relationship existed between an unmarried couple, determining
the defendant breached the relationship, and imposing a constructive trust in
favor of the plaintiff on a house that was jointly purchased but on which the
defendant alone had legal title).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
49–53 (2011).
72. See id. § 49(2).
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a known risk that the conduct would violate the rights of the
claimant; in such a situation, the defendant is liable for the
amount transferred from the claimant to the defendant and for
any net profit attributable to the underlying wrong.73 (For
example, the defendant who misappropriates claimant’s money
and successfully invests it for a net profit must disgorge the gain
to the claimant.)74 Rhode Island law has long recognized the rule
that a conscious wrongdoer or defaulting fiduciary must disgorge
the net gain from money wrongfully obtained from the claimant.75
If a defendant has been unjustly enriched by a nonreturnable
benefit, the measure of a money judgment in restitution generally
will vary according to the blameworthiness of the defendant in
obtaining the benefit; extensive rules are set forth in the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.76 If
the defendant was an innocent recipient of the benefit (e.g., the
claimant mistakenly conferred a benefit on the defendant), the
defendant generally must give back only the monetary value of
the benefit, conservatively measured.77 If the defendant was
responsible for its own enrichment but not a “conscious
wrongdoer” (e.g., the defendant was negligent or unreasonably
failed, despite notice and opportunity, to avoid or rectify the
unjust enrichment), the defendant may be subject to greater
73. See id. § 51(4). The Restatement elaborates how to determine “net
profit.” Id. § 51(5) & cmts. e–j.
74. See id. §§ 49(4), 51 & illus. 10, 12.
75. See, e.g., Greene v. Haskell, 5 R.I. 447, 456–57 (R.I. 1858). In
Greene, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the defendant had
wrongfully taken the plaintiffs’ money to pay partially for African ivory. Id.
at 454. The ivory was to be sold. Id. The court stated that the plaintiffs
were entitled to either their proportion of the proceeds of the sale of the ivory
or the return of their money that was used to purchase the ivory. Id. at 456–
57. This case illustrates the rule that a conscious wrongdoer should disgorge
any gain resulting from the wrongful retention of a benefit at the plaintiff’s
expense. However, the court required that the plaintiffs make this election
before the sale. Id. The Restatement criticizes the court’s decision to make
the plaintiffs choose their remedy prior to the sale as “inconsistent with the
principle that the conscious wrongdoer be denied any chance of profit from
the use of another’s property.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56, reporter’s note h (emphasis added).
76. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
49(3), 50–52.
77. See id. § 50 (stating rules for measuring the value of nonreturnable
benefits acquired by an innocent recipient, varying on whether the benefit
was requested or not requested by the innocent recipient of the benefit).
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liability in restitution than an innocent recipient of the same
benefit; the measure of the defendant’s enrichment may be chosen
so as to avoid or mitigate loss to the claimant.78 With respect to a
“conscious wrongdoer” or a defaulting fiduciary, the remedial rule
is the same for nonreturnable benefits as it is for a monetary
transfer from the claimant to the defendant—the defendant must
disgorge net gains to the claimant.79
Beyond the remedial rules that a “conscious wrongdoer” or
defaulting fiduciary must disgorge to the claimant any net gain
the defendant made, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment also recognizes that for certain breaches of
contract (which it labels “opportunistic” breaches), the breaching
party may be liable to disgorge its net gain from the breach.80
Relying on abundant case law in several jurisdictions, the
Restatement (Third) states that a claimant should be able to
recover the defendant’s net profits resulting from the defendant’s
breach if the breach was deliberate and contract damages for the
claimant’s loss would afford “inadequate protection to the
promisee’s contractual entitlement.”81 The latter condition is
satisfied if a court with the benefit of hindsight would have
granted an injunction or specific performance because contract
damages would not have been adequate to protect the claimant’s
rights under the contract.82
An example of disgorgement of profits for “opportunistic”
breach of contract in the Restatement (Third) involves a contract
for the sale of real estate providing that existing timber and gravel
are to be conveyed with the property.83 The seller of the real
estate breaches the contract by removing the timber and gravel,
which the seller sells at a profit of $10,000. The purchaser later

78. See id. § 52.
79. See, e.g., Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 2003)
(assuming that Rhode Island would adopt a disgorgement-of-profits rule to
“avoid[ ] unjust enrichment for redemption of minority shareholders’ stock
involving a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate officers who are majority
shareholders in close corporations”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51.
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
39.
81. Id.
82. Id. at § 39 cmt. c.
83. See id. § 39 cmt. d, illus. 2.
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takes title to the real estate. The removal of timber and gravel
does not diminish the market value of the real estate; contract
damages for the purchaser’s loss accordingly would be minimal. A
contract damages remedy for such a breach would afford
“inadequate protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement”
to obtain the real estate with the timber and gravel still attached.
Thus, the purchaser is entitled to recover seller’s $10,000 profit.84
The foregoing illustration in the Restatement (Third) is based
on a Massachusetts case.85 I have not found a reported Rhode
Island case that directly addresses whether disgorgement of
defendant’s profits is an appropriate remedy for breach of
contract. However, on the strength of the Restatement (Third)
and case law in other jurisdictions, one could argue that Rhode
Island law should recognize the availability of disgorgement of
profits when the defendant’s breach of contract is both profitable
to the defendant and contract damages would afford inadequate
protection to the claimant’s contractual rights.
B. Restitution Through an Asset-Based Remedy
The law of restitution affords very powerful asset-based
remedies. These remedies are advantageous when the claimant
wants its particular asset back, when claimant’s asset (or its
traceable product) has increased in value, or when the defendant
is insolvent. Asset-based restitutionary remedies at law include
replevin, which is the return of personal property to which the
claimant retains legal title (such as when the property has been
stolen). Asset-based restitutionary remedies in equity include the
constructive trust and equitable lien, which grant the claimant a
property interest in a specific asset to which the defendant has
obtained legal title but in which the claimant has an “equitable”
interest. For example, a claimant would have an equitable
interest in an asset that the defendant obtained because of the
claimant’s mistake or the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.
Moreover, restitution through an asset-based remedy allows the
84. See id.
85. Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678–79 (Mass.
1977) (noting that defendant’s breach was “deliberate and willful” and a
disgorgement remedy on the facts was not punitive—disgorgement “merely
deprives the defendant of a profit wrongfully made, a profit which the
plaintiff was entitled to make”).
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claimant to trace its property or funds through subsequent
transfers or changes in form.
1.

Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien Defined

The constructive trust is a remedy that requires the
defendant to convey specific property or funds to the claimant.86
It is based on the fiction that the defendant is holding the
property or funds as “trustee” for the claimant, with the claimant
being the “equitable” owner of the property or funds.87 The
equitable lien is a remedy that secures a money judgment against
the defendant with a specific asset in which the claimant is
deemed the “equitable” lienholder.88 The Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment states that a claimant need
not demonstrate the inadequacy of legal remedies in order to
obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien; I found no Rhode
Island case law to the contrary.89
Generally, a claimant should prefer a constructive trust if the
claimant’s asset or its traceable product has increased value. A
claimant should prefer an equitable lien if the value of the
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
55.
87. See id. A constructive trust should not be confused with a resulting
trust. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has explained the
distinction:
Unlike resulting trusts, which are used primarily to enforce the
parties’ unstated plan at the time of the transfer [of an asset],
constructive trusts are used as remedial devices regardless of the
parties’ original intent “whenever title to property is found in one
who in fairness ought not to be allowed to retain it.”
In re Valente, 360 F.3d 256, 262–63 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 262 (1973)).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
56.
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(2).
To determine whether Rhode Island law requires that a claimant seeking a
constructive trust or equitable lien must establish the inadequacy of legal
remedies, I conducted research on February 3, 2015 in the LexisNexis online
database, “RI Federal and State Cases, Combined.” For the first search, I
used the terms “constructive pre/1 trust” w/50 “inadeq! w/8 remed!”; for the
second search, I used the terms “equitable pre/1lien” w/50 “inadeq! w/8
remed!” Neither search revealed Rhode Island case law requiring a claimant
to demonstrate the inadequacy of legal remedies in order to obtain a
constructive trust or equitable lien.
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identifiable property is less than the amount of the defendant’s
liability because the claimant will be entitled to a money
judgment for the full liability amount. That judgment amount is
secured by an equitable lien on the property, and the deficiency
can be pursued by other collection means.90
2. Requirements for Imposition of the Constructive Trust or
Equitable Lien
Under Rhode Island law, the person seeking imposition of a
constructive trust or equitable lien must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the remedy is warranted.91
To obtain a constructive trust or equitable lien, the restitution
claimant must show that the “defendant is unjustly enriched by
the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of
the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.”92 In other
words, the claimant must both establish a claim under the
substantive law of unjust enrichment and identify specific
property in which the claimant has an “equitable” interest. In
terms of substantive law, Rhode Island courts thus far have
recognized the possibility of a constructive trust or equitable lien
when an asset has been acquired through violation of a fiduciary
or confidential relationship,93 undue influence,94 fraud,95
90. See, e.g., Darr v. Muratore, 143 B.R. 973, 976 (D.R.I. 1992) (“Where a
defendant has used the funds of a plaintiff to purchase new property, the
plaintiff may have the option of enforcing either a constructive trust of the
property or an equitable lien against the property.”).
91. See, e.g., Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1013 (R.I. 2007).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55(1).
93. See, e.g., Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111–12 (R.I. 2005)
(stating that imposition of a constructive trust requires existence of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties and either a breach
of a fiduciary duty or fraud resulting from the parties’ association; former
daughter-in-law not entitled to constructive trust over house owned by inlaws and in which she resided because facts did not establish a fiduciary or
confidential relationship); Sladen v. Rowse, 347 A.2d 409, 412–13 (R.I. 1975)
(imposing a constructive trust on stock in favor of claimant company because
defendant, who was a director and officer of the company, breached his
fiduciary obligations by diverting the opportunity to buy the stock at a low
price to himself); Nani v. Vanasse, C.A. No. PC/05-995, 2003 WL 24274579, at
*7–11 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2006) (finding a confidential relationship
existed between an unmarried couple, defendant breached the relationship,
and imposing a constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff on a house that was
jointly purchased but to which the defendant alone had legal title). Under
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misappropriation,96 or testamentary devise or intestate succession
in exchange for a promise to hold in trust.97 The Restatement
(Third) also recognizes mistaken transfer of an asset as
supporting the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable
lien.98
Once a claim under the substantive law of unjust enrichment
is established, the claimant also must show that it has an
equitable interest in a specific asset to which the initial recipient
or a third person has legal title.99 This showing can be made
directly—when the very asset obtained from the claimant is held
by the initial recipient or a third person—or by tracing the
claimant’s asset through subsequent changes in form.100
3. Advantages of an Asset-Based Equitable Remedy Compared to
a Simple Money Judgment
An asset-based equitable remedy may be more advantageous
to the claimant than a simple money judgment in a variety of
circumstances, which are listed and exemplified below.
Rhode Island law, if a fiduciary or confidential relationship is proven, the
plaintiff must also prove “either a breach of a promise or an act involving
fraud occurred as a result of the relationship.” Manchester, 926 A.2d at 1013.
94. See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, No. 03–CV–219–S, 2005 WL 5438379, at
*1 (D.R.I. Feb. 18, 2005) (stating that undue influence is a “set of
circumstances which gives rise to an equitable remedy, such as . . . imposition
of a constructive trust”).
95. See, e.g., J.K. Social Club v. J.K. Realty Corp., 448 A.2d 130, 134 (R.
I. 1982) (“For fraud to lead to the creation of a constructive trust, the
evidence must show that the holder of legal title procured title through fraud.
There must be an actual misrepresentation of present intent.”).
96. See, e.g., Slater v. Oriental Mills, 27 A. 443, 443–44 (R.I. 1893)
(authorizing a constructive trust in situation of misappropriation).
97. See, e.g., Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 1985).
98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 55
cmt. f (2011) (“The underlying transaction is ordinarily one that is subject to
avoidance for fraud, mistake, or comparable grounds of invalidity, or one in
which the defendant has acquired property by wrongful interference with the
claimant’s legally protected interests.”).
99. See id. §§ 55, 56.
100. See, e.g., Slater, 27 A. at 443 (“The rule is clear that one has an
equitable right to follow and reclaim his property, which has been wrongfully
appropriated by another, so long as he can find the property, or its
substantial equivalent if its form has been changed, upon the ground that
such property, in whatever form, is impressed with a trust in favor of the
owner.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 58.
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a. The constructive trust is advantageous when the asset in which
the claimant has an equitable interest has increased in
value.101
Example: Through undue influence, Defendant
obtained stock worth $1,000 from Claimant. The
stock is now worth $2,000. Claimant should seek a
constructive trust over the stock rather than a money
judgment for $1,000 (the value of the stock when
initially obtained from Claimant).
b. The constructive trust or equitable lien enables a claimant to
trace its asset through subsequent changes in form.102
Example: Through fraud, Defendant obtained stock
from Claimant worth $1,000. Defendant sold the
stock and reinvested the full $1,000 to purchase a
work of art for $1,000. The art is now worth $2,000.
Claimant may obtain the work of art via a
constructive trust.

101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT ch.
7, topic 2, intro. note (“Where assets have increased in value, restitution from
property may give the claimant the benefit of the appreciation without the
need to prove the amount of the defendant’s enrichment.”); id. at §55 cmt. i.
102. See, e.g., Slater, 27 A. at 443 (“The rule is clear that one has an
equitable right to follow and reclaim his property, which has been wrongfully
appropriated by another, so long as he can find the property, or its
substantial equivalent if its form has been changed, upon the ground that
such property, in whatever form, is impressed with a trust in favor of the
owner.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 58.
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c. If the claimant’s asset has been commingled with the
defendant’s asset in a common account, the claimant may, by
tracing rules, identify its asset in the account and, in some
circumstances, take advantage of any withdrawals that are
invested profitably.103
Example: Acting without authorization, Recipient
deposits $1,000 of Claimant’s funds in a bank
account that already contains $1,000 of Recipient’s
funds. Recipient makes a $1,500 withdrawal, using
$1,000 for current expenditures and $500 to purchase
shares of XYZ Corp. The traceable product of
Claimant’s original $1,000 may now be identified in
the $500 balance in the bank account plus the XYZ
shares. Recipient holds the $500 in constructive
trust for Claimant. Restitution from the XYZ shares
will be effected by a constructive trust or equitable
lien, at Claimant’s election, depending on whether
the shares have appreciated or declined in value. If
the XYZ shares are now worth $600, Claimant is
entitled to the gain by a constructive trust over the
shares. If the XYZ shares are now worth $400,
Claimant is entitled to a judgment of $500, secured
by an equitable lien on the shares. Claimant is
entitled to the shares worth $400 and retains an
unsecured claim for $100.104

103. See, e.g., Hungerford v. Curtis, 110 A. 650, 652 (R.I. 1920) (“The fact
that complainant’s money was intermingled with [defendant’s] did not
destroy complainant’s equitable title and his right to follow and reclaim it.”);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 58–
59 (discussing tracing of property into its product and into or through a
commingled fund).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59
cmt. d, illus. 5.
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d. The constructive trust or equitable lien enables the claimant to
trace its asset into the hands of a third person who is not a
bona fide purchaser or a bona fide payee and to obtain that
asset from the third person.105
Example: Through duress, Defendant obtains $1,000
from Claimant, buys a used car with the $1,000, and
transfers title of the car to a third person. Claimant
is entitled to a constructive trust over the car held by
the third person even if the third person committed
no wrong. However, the third person may have a
defense against the restitution claim if she was a
bona fide purchaser of the car.106
e. The constructive trust or equitable lien is advantageous to the
claimant if the recipient is insolvent, because the claimant’s
property interest in the asset is not considered part of the
recipient’s bankruptcy estate.107
Example: If Claimant can trace its asset into the
bank account of an insolvent debtor, the funds are
imposed with a constructive trust for the benefit of
Claimant. Other creditors have no claim to those
funds.
Limitation: If the insolvent debtor in the above
example has unpaid creditors or innocent
dependents, Claimant can only recover its actual
losses. That is, Claimant is not entitled to recover
any gains that the insolvent debtor may have

105. See id. § 58(2) (“A claimant entitled to restitution from property or
its traceable product may assert the same rights against any subsequent
transferee who is not a bona fide purchaser . . . or a bona fide payee.”). For
discussion of the bona fide purchaser or payee defense, see below Part IV.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 (2).
107. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612,
618 (1st Cir. 1988) (“When a debtor is in possession of property impressed by
a trust–express or constructive–the bankrupt estate holds the property
subject to the outstanding interest of the beneficiaries. . . . [T]he claimant
must identify the trust fund or property and, where the trust fund has been
commingled with general property of the bankrupt, sufficiently trace the
property or funds–the res.”).
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obtained from Claimant’s asset.108
C. Implications for Discovery
Because of the distinctive advantages of restitutionary
remedies, it may be prudent during discovery to seek information
about potential gains the defendant made as a result of its
dealings with the plaintiff, and, if the defendant obtained an asset
from the plaintiff, any actions the defendant took with respect to
the asset. For example, did the defendant transfer the claimant’s
money or property to someone else? Did the defendant purchase a
different asset with the plaintiff’s money or property? Did the
defendant put the claimant’s money in a banking or investment
account or otherwise invest the money?
There are three independent reasons for seeking to trace the
claimant’s asset. First, if the defendant was a “conscious”
wrongdoer or one who violated a fiduciary or confidential duty,
any gain that the defendant made with the asset can be recovered
by the claimant via restitution, even if that gain is greater than
the claimant’s loss.109 (Of course, if the defendant’s gain is less
than the claimant’s loss, then the claimant will instead pursue
compensatory damages for the loss resulting from the wrong.)
Second, the claimant may be entitled to a constructive trust or
equitable lien on the traceable product of its asset.110 Third, if the
defendant becomes insolvent, a restitution claimant’s success in
tracing its money or property into an asset held by the defendant
will give the claimant a property interest in the asset, and the
asset will not be considered part of any eventual bankruptcy
estate.111
In a breach of contract case, the plaintiff may want to inquire
during discovery whether the breaching party made a profit from
the breach. If the breaching party did profit from the breach, the
claimant may be entitled to the breaching party’s profits,
providing the breach meets the elements of an “opportunistic”
breach discussed earlier.112
108.
§ 61.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION
See supra Part II.D & Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.A.

AND

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
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IV. DEFENSES TO THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSE OF ACTION

In addition to defenses that apply generally in civil
litigation,113 a defendant to an unjust enrichment claim may be
able to invoke defenses that are unique to the law of
restitution.114 One example is detrimental change of position—an
innocent recipient of a benefit (usually in the circumstance of a
mistaken payment) has a defense to the restitution claim if the
recipient justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistaken
benefit.115 The defendant may not escape making restitution to
the claimant, however, if the defendant’s only reliance was paying
living expenses or preexisting debts.116 Another example is the
bona fide purchaser defense—a claimant may not obtain
restitution of property from a third person if the third person was
a bona fide purchaser for value of the property.117 Parallel to the
113. In the absence of a specific statutory limitations period applicable to
a particular claim, it appears that unjust enrichment claims fall within the
general limitations period of ten years under Rhode Island General Laws
section 9-1-13. See, e.g., Jonklaas v. Silverman, 370 A.2d 1277, 1280 (R.I.
1977) (applying Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-13 to a claim of
mistaken payment of money).
114. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 62–70 (2011).
115. See id. § 65. A claim to restitution based on mistake may be defeated
if the defendant justifiably relied to its detriment on the mistaken benefit.
See, e.g., Romano v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of R.I., 767 A.2d 35, 45
(R.I. 2001) (recognizing change of position as a defense to claim of restitution
to recover money paid by mistake; burden is on recipient of mistaken
payment to prove change of position (citing Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at 1281–82)).
116. See, e.g., Romano, 767 A.2d at 45 (quoting Jonklaas, 370 A.2d at
1282); see also Goodbody & Co., Inc., v. Parente, 358 A.2d 32, 34–35 (R.I.
1976) (holding that where claimant had mistakenly transferred shares and
dividends to recipient, recipient’s bad-faith delay in making restitution
precluded any defense based on change of position).
117. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §§ 66, 68, 69 (discussing, respectively, the bona fide purchaser
defense, the concept of “for value,” and the requirement that the recipient of
the benefit must have acted “without notice” of the facts giving rise to the
restitution claim). An example of the bona fide purchaser defense applied in
Rhode Island is Fleckhamer v. Fleckhamer, 147 A. 886, 887–88 (R.I. 1929), in
which a son wrongfully took money from a bank account held jointly by him
and his mother, purchased two parcels of real estate with the money, and
named his wife as joint tenant. Id. at 887. Upon the son’s death, the wife
conveyed both parcels to Landin, the person with whom she was living. Id.
Landin sold one parcel to Doyle and granted a mortgage in the other parcel to
Doyle as security for Doyle’s loan to Landin. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme
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bona fide purchaser defense is the bona fide payee defense. This
defense may arise when a recipient obtains money that is not its
own, whether by mistake or misappropriation, and uses that
money to pay its creditor. The creditor, if it did not have notice of
the mistake or misappropriation, is considered a bona fide payee
with a defense to any restitution claim.118 This is true even if the
money is still identifiable as the asset of the restitution claimant
and even if the bona fide payee had not detrimentally relied on the
payment.119
CONCLUSION

This overview of restitutionary causes of action and remedies
has been intended to serve as a starting point for recognizing
when a cause of action in unjust enrichment may exist and when
restitutionary remedies may be of particular benefit to a claimant.
Practitioners with potential unjust enrichment claims are
encouraged to consult not only the Rhode Island cases referenced
in the footnotes, but also the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment for a deep and comprehensive treatment
of the substantive and remedial law and for very helpful
illustrations and case citations.

Court determined that the mother was entitled to restitution from the wife
and Landin because they were not bona fide purchasers for value. Id. at 888.
The court also ruled that the mother was not entitled to restitution from
Doyle because his rights in the real estate were acquired by bona fide
purchases for value, without notice of the facts giving rise to the restitution
claim. Id. at 888.
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§
67, 68, 69 (discussing, respectively, the bona fide payee defense, the concept
of “for value,” and the requirement that the recipient of the benefit must have
acted “without notice” of the facts giving rise to the restitution claim).
119. See id.

